Skeleton of Theology: Lecture 23

Skeleton of Theology: Lecture 23

SKELETONS OF A COURSE OF

THEOLOGICAL LECTURES

BY THE

REV. CHAS. G. FINNEY    

 

Lecture XXIII.

Moral Government.–No. 2.

 

Foundation Of Moral Obligation.

 

First. Inquire what Moral Obligation is.

Second. State the conditions of Moral Obligation.

Third. What is the foundation of Moral Obligation.

 

Under this head I shall show:

I. The different answers that have been given to the inquiry, What is the foundation of Moral Obligation?

II. Show wherein they agree.

III. Wherein they differ.

IV. What the real question is not.

V. What it is.

VI. Answer the question, or show what the foundation of Moral Obligation is.

 

To avoid confusion in discussing this subject, I will premise the following things:

l. There is a difference between the foundation or fundamental reason of Moral Obligation, and other reasons that may exist.

2. The foundation of Moral Obligation must be the ultimate reason upon which the obligation rests.

3. An ultimate reason is a first truth, in support of which there can be no proof, and of which no more can be or need be said than that so it is.

4. There is a plain and important distinction between willing or preferring the existence of a thing, as that which is desirable in itself, and on its own account, and willing to create, do, or give existence to that thing. I may prefer or will the existence of what I cannot do; but I cannot will to do what I know I cannot do. For example, were a moral being so perfectly isolated that neither God nor any other being knew of his existence, and were he at the same time acquainted with the existence of God and the universe, universal benevolence would be his duty, although his benevolence would remain forever unknown to every being but himself, and no one but himself could ever be effected by it. Nor could the fundamental reason of this obligation be, that benevolence would make himself happy, but that the good of God and the universe is infinitely valuable and desirable in itself, and for its own sake, and on this account he would be under obligation to will it. In this case it is plain that the obligation would be to will the good of the universe, but not to will to do them good, as this were impossible; that is, it would be impossible to do them good, or to will to do it.

5. It may be my duty to be benevolent toward, or to will the happiness of a being, as a good in itself, whose happiness I am not at liberty to promote. For example, God and all beings are under obligation to exercise benevolence towards Satan and yet may not will to make him happy. This shows,

6. That to will the good of others for its own sake is benevolence, but to will to do them good, may or may not be an expression of benevolence, according to the circumstances of the case.

7. Benevolence is always right, because benevolence is good willing, or willing the good of the universe; and the good of the universe is desirable on its own account, and for its own sake.

8. Good willing is right, not merely because it is right, but because good is good, and to be willed on its own account.

9. Benevolence is right, not merely because it is useful, but because the thing which benevolence wills or the object willed is a good in itself, and to be willed for its own sake.

10. There is a difference between a law’s being a rule of duty and the reasons for conforming to that rule. ‘The rule is one thing, and the reasons for that rule are another thing.

 

First. Inquire what moral obligation is.

Obligation is that which binds. Moral Obligation is the binding force of moral law, upon moral agents,

 

Second. Conditions of moral obligation.

1. Moral agency. I have given in the first of this course of lectures an outline of what constitutes a moral agent, and need not repeat it here.

2. Moral law, or a rule of right, is another condition of Moral Obligation.

3. Some degree of knowledge of this law or rule of right, and of its application to the point in question.

 

Third. What is the foundation of Moral Obligation?

Under this head I am to show,

 

I. The different answers that are given to this question.

1. Some affirm that the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation; and that moral beings are under obligation to conform themselves to the law of God, simply and only because such is his will.

2. Others affirm that right is the foundation of Moral Obligation; that moral agents are bound to do right, simply and only because it is right.

3. Others affirm that utility is the foundation of Moral Obligation; that the tendency of virtue to promote happiness is the fundamental reason why moral agents should be virtuous, and of course the foundation of moral obligation.

4. Others affirm that the nature and relations of moral agents is the foundation of Moral Obligation.

5. Others affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation lies partly in the nature and relations of moral beings, partly in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue, and partly in the nature and intrinsic value of happiness.

6. Others affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation lies in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue and happiness; that they are an ultimate good, and therefore to be chosen for their own sake.

7. Others still deny that right or virtue is an ultimate good; and affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation is in the nature and intrinsic value of happiness alone. They affirm that that cannot be an ultimate good which naturally and necessarily results in some other good beyond itself, of which it is not only a condition, but a cause. They affirm that consciousness testifies that right or virtue naturally, and so far as we can perceive necessarily results in happiness; and that therefore it is not in itself an ultimate good, but only a condition or cause of happiness, which is the only ultimate good; and that for this reason, right or virtue cannot be the foundation of Moral Obligation. They maintain that right or virtue are only the condition or cause of happiness, and not happiness itself; and that abstracted from the happiness in which it results, it is of no more intrinsic value than the motion of the planets. To this it is replied that right, or virtue is the ultimate good, and that happiness is only its reward, or an added blessing. To this it is answered, that happiness is a natural and necessary consequence of virtue, and not merely something given as a compensation, or as the reward of virtue; and if this is not so, it is inquired, who bestows the rewards of virtue upon God?

 

II. I am to show wherein they who maintain these different theories agree.

1. They agree in respect to what constitutes moral agency.

2. They agree that moral agency is an indispensable condition of Moral Obligation.

3. They agree in respect to all the conditions of Moral Obligation, as above specified.

4. They agree that all moral agents are under Moral Obligation.

5. They agree that God is a moral agent, and the subject of Moral Obligation; and that he could not be virtuous if he were not.

6. They agree that God, and all moral agents are under a moral and immutable obligation to will and act in perfect conformity with their nature and relations.

7. They agree that universal benevolence, or good willing is in precise conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings; and that it is therefore the substance and the whole of virtue.

8. They agree that right consists in volition, or right willing, and always resolves itself into benevolence, and that right, and benevolence, and willing, and acting in conformity with the nature and relation of moral beings are incidental.

9. They agree that right, benevolence, or acting in conformity with their nature and relations is universally obligatory on moral beings.

10. They agree that God does invariably will and act in conformity with his nature and relations, and the relations of all beings.

11. That his will is therefore always right or benevolent, and is therefore the rule of duty to all moral agents.

12. They agree that virtue is an indispensable condition of the happiness of moral beings.

13. They agree that virtue or benevolence naturally and necessarily results in the happiness of him who exercises it.

14. They agree that happiness is a good in itself, that it is an ultimate good, and to be chosen for its own sake.

15. They agree that misery is an evil in itself, and to be dreaded and rejected for its own sake.

16. They agree that moral agents are under Moral Obligation to will the happiness of all beings in proportion to their capacity for happiness.

17. They agree that right and utility are always at one; that what is upon the whole useful, is right; and that what is right, is upon the whole useful.

18. They agree in their definition of moral agency, and in their definition of Moral Obligation. They agree as to who are subjects of Moral Obligation. They agree as to the conditions of Moral Obligation; that right, and benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings are identical; and that this course of willing and acting is universally obligatory on moral agents. But,

 

III. They differ in respect to the why, or in the fundamental reason of this obligation.

 

IV. But this leads me to show what the real point of inquiry is not.

1. It is not whether the will of God is obligatory upon all created moral agents. For this is on all hands admitted.

2. The inquiry is not what constitutes moral agency.

3. Nor whether moral agency is a condition of Moral Obligation.

4. Nor whether moral agents are bound to do right.

5. Nor whether moral agents are under obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations.

6. Nor whether the utility of an act may not be one reason why it is obligatory.

7. Nor is the inquiry why moral agents are under obligation to do right, or act in conformity with their nature and relations any more than a beast is under Moral Obligation to do so; for in this case the plain and only answer would be, that they are under Moral Obligation, because they are moral agents; and that beasts are not, because they are not moral agents. This conducts to the real point of inquiry.

 

V. The true and only question is, why are moral agents under Moral Obligation to do right rather than wrong; to be benevolent, rather than malevolent; to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than to act contrary to them? As right, benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings are the same thing, the question is one, and may be stated thus: What is the fundamental reason why moral agents should be benevolent, or will the good of being? Suppose we consider this inquiry as respecting God, and ask: Why is God under obligation to be benevolent, or to will good?

 

VI. Answer the question, or show what the foundation of Moral Obligation is,

 

1. It is not the will of God.

(1.) It is plain that his obligation could not arise from, or be founded in his own will.

(2.) The will of God cannot be the foundation of Moral Obligation in created moral agents. It is admitted that God is himself the subject of Moral Obligation. If so, there is some reason, independent of his own will, why he wills as he does, some reason that imposes obligation upon him to will as he does will. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral agents, is not the foundation reason of their obligation; but the foundation of their obligation must be that reason which induces God, or makes it obligatory on him to will in respect to the conduct of moral agents, just what he does.

(3.) If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he could, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice.

(4.) If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he not only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do so; for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon him as upon his creatures, he could at any time, by willing it, make malevolence a virtue, and benevolence a vice.

(5.) If the will of God be the foundation of Moral Obligation, we have no standard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and cannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame.

(6.) If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he has no standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule with which to compare his own actions.

(7.) If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he is not himself a subject of Moral Obligation. But,

(8.) If God is not a subject of Moral Obligation, he has no moral character; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or non conformity to Moral Obligation. The will of God, as expressed in his law, is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out the path of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to act in conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God itself.

 

2. Right is not the foundation of Moral Obligation.

Let it be remembered, that right, benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings are the same thing.

It the fundamental reason for doing right, being benevolent, or acting in conformity with our nature and relations, is simply because, and only because it is right, it must be that right, benevolence, or acting in conformity with our nature and relations, is the ultimate good, or a good in itself, entirely independent of any good that results from it. But this contradicts consciousness, and cannot therefore be true. If right be valuable in itself, it may so far be chosen for its own sake, and be a reason of Moral Obligation. Yet as it naturally and certainly results in a good beyond itself, it certainly is not the ultimate good, and therefore is not the foundation or fundamental reason of Moral Obligation. But we are not inquiring for all the reasons that may render virtue obligatory, but we are inquiring after the fundamental or ultimate reason, that which is at the bottom or foundation of all other reasons. This cannot be right; for right certainly is not the ultimate reason, as it naturally results in a good beyond itself. For this we have the testimony of consciousness. To this it is objected, as has been already shown, that right is the ultimate good, and that happiness is a reward or added blessing.

To this it has already been answered, that happiness is a natural and necessary consequence or result of virtue; and that although it is a reward of virtue, it is that in which virtue necessarily results, and if this were not so, it is inquired, who would bestow on God the rewards of virtue?

But to this view of the subject it is again objected, that moral agents affirm the rightness of any course of conduct as the reason for that course of conduct; and this must be the true reason, or it would not be virtuous.

To this it may be replied, that they may, and often do assign a true reason and a good reason for their conduct, when they do not assign the fundamental reason. They often assign the will of God as a reason; they often assign utility as a reason; they often assert the dictates of conscience as a reason. Each and all of these may, in some cases, be reasons, and good reasons, while neither of them if the fundamental reason.

Again it is asserted, that no other reason can be assigned for acting right, than that it is right, and that this runs us up to our first principle, and is a first or ultimate truth. But from the testimony of our consciousness we know this to be false. For although its being right may be a reason of Moral Obligation, it certainly is not the only reason, nor is it the fundamental reason, for we certainly know from consciousness that right naturally and necessarily results in happiness, which is a good beyond itself, and consequently that happiness is the fundamental or foundation reason of the obligation. This brings me to say,

 

3. That Utility is not the foundation of Moral Obligation. That benevolence will produce happiness, is not the foundation upon which the obligation to benevolence rests. For as happiness is a good in itself, to will its existence would be obligatory, if the willing it did not and could not produce it. Were a moral being completely insulated in his existence, universal benevolence would be his duty, did he know that other beings existed, although his benevolence could make no being in the universe happy. But if the foundation of the obligation to benevolence lay in the tendency of benevolence to promote the happiness of its object, if it were certain that his benevolence could do no one any good, the obligation would cease.

If to this it be replied, that in such circumstances he would be under obligation to be benevolent, because of its tendency to promote his own happiness; to this it may be answered, that it is impossible to be benevolent for that reason. Benevolence is good willing. Benevolence to others is willing good to others. But to will good to others for the sake of my own happiness, is a contradiction; for it is willing good to myself as an end, and willing good to others only as a means. This is not benevolence, but selfishness. In this case the supposition is that I am to be benevolent or to will the happiness of others, not because it is a good in itself, and therefore to be desired for its own sake, not because it will promote the happiness of its object, but simply and only because it will promote my own happiness.

Now it is not only impossible for me to be benevolent for this reason, as it contradicts the very nature of benevolence, but such an exercise, could it be put forth, could not promote my own happiness. It could promote my own happiness only as it was in accordance with the laws of my being; but my consciousness testifies and my reason affirms that happiness is a good in itself, that it is an ultimate good, and ought to be chosen for its own sake. If, therefore, I could will the happiness of other beings mainly for the sake of making myself happy, or as the means of my own happiness, this would not be acting in accordance with the laws of my being, and consequently could not make me happy. Therefore it is impossible that utility should be the foundation of Moral Obligation.

We have already seen that there is a difference between willing the existence of the happiness of all beings, in itself considered, and as a good in itself, and willing to make all beings or a particular being happy. The former is benevolence, and always, and universally obligatory. The latter is an expression or carrying out of benevolence, but its obligation is not universal, because the universal good demands that some wicked beings should be miserable and not happy.

Again. It is impossible to will to do what we know to be impossible. We may will the existence of what we know we cannot effect, but we cannot will to do what we know we cannot do. Hence we may and ought to will the happiness of all beings, as a good in itself, but we cannot will to make all beings happy.

 

4. The foundation of Moral Obligation does not lie in the nature and relations of moral beings. The affirmation that it does is founded in a mistaken apprehension of the real question in debate. As has been already said, the true question is not, why are moral agents under obligation to do right, to be benevolent, to act in conformity with their nature and relations, any more than brutes are under such obligation? If this were the inquiry, the true answer would doubtless be, because they are moral agents, and not brutes; because their nature and relations are what they are.

It should be remembered that the true inquiry is, why are moral agents under obligation to do right rather than wrong; to be benevolent, rather than malevolent; to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than contrary to them? If, then, to the question, why are moral agents under Moral Obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than contrary to them, it be replied, that their nature and relations are the foundation of this obligation, this is only saying they are under obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations rather than contrary to them, because they are under such obligation. This is only to assert their obligation, but is not assigning the reason. If to this it be replied, that no other reason can be assigned, it may be answered, that another, and a good and sufficient reason can be assigned, and ought to be assigned. Benevolence is willing in exact conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings. But benevolence is willing the existence of universal happiness as a good in itself.

This is a good, and sufficient, and infinitely weighty reason why moral beings should be benevolent, or act in conformity with their nature and relations. Acting contrary to their nature and relations is malevolence, or willing something inconsistent with universal happiness. But misery is an evil in itself, and therefore to be rejected for its own sake. This, then, is a good and sufficient reason why moral beings ought not to act contrary to their natures and relations.

The foundation of Moral Obligation, then, does not lie in the nature and relations of moral beings.

 

5. The foundation does not lie partly in the nature and relations of moral beings, partly in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue, and partly in the nature or intrinsic value of happiness. The affirmation that these are altogether the foundation of Moral Obligation is founded partly in a misapprehension of the real question at issue, and partly in the assumption that virtue or right is an ultimate good in itself, and apart from that happiness in which it results.

We have just seen that the foundation of Moral Obligation cannot be in the nature and relations of moral beings, because the question is not why are moral beings, rather than other beings, under Moral Obligation, but why are moral beings under obligation to do right rather than wrong? To say that the intrinsic value of right or virtue is the fundamental, or even one of the fundamental reasons of Moral Obligation, is to assume that right or virtue has an intrinsic value in itself. That its value is not ultimate, but that it results in something beyond itself, has already been shown; and should it be admitted, as perhaps it ought to be, that right or virtue is a good in itself, still it is not an ultimate good; and although it may be a reason of Moral Obligation, it is not the fundamental reason or foundation of Moral Obligation, as our consciousness testifies that there is another reason still below it. But the foundation of Moral Obligation is that after which we are inquiring.

 

6. The foundation of Moral Obligation does not lie in the nature and intrinsic value of both virtue and happiness. This has just been sufficiently shown. But,

 

7. The foundation of Moral Obligation does lie in the intrinsic value of happiness as an ultimate good. It has been shown that right always has its foundation in volition, and that right willing is always good willing, or benevolence. The foundation reason, then, why God and all moral beings should be benevolent, or will good, is that good is a good in itself, and to be willed for its own sake. The reason why they are under obligation not to be malevolent, to will evil, or to act contrary to their nature in willing evil to any being is that evil is an evil in itself, to be universally dreaded and rejected for its own sake. In other words, all Moral Obligation resolves itself into an obligation to will the universal good of being. The question is, why are moral agents under obligation to will the good of being? The answer is, because good is good. Happiness is an ultimate good, to be chosen for its own sake, and therefore the fundamental reason of Moral Obligation is, that good is good, and to be willed or chosen by all moral beings as a good, and an ultimate good in itself.

This, then, is the sum of the whole matter. Moral right consists in willing and acting in precise conformity with the nature and relations of moral agents.

Moral Obligation is the binding force of right upon moral agents.

The foundation of Moral Obligation to do right and not wrong, is not,

1. In the nature and relations of moral agents.

2. Not in right. These are reasons, but not the foundation.

Right is benevolence or right willing. Right willing is good willing, or willing good.

Moral agents are bound to will good, plainly, not because good willing will produce good, but because GOOD is GOOD.

REMARK.

This shows why the gospel offers a reward to virtue, and yet insists that that is not virtue in which reward is the motive to action.

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